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1. Introduction 
“Encryption is just a bunch of math, and math has no agency”1 
Since ancient times, society has felt the need to hide sensitive information: cryptography in its 
various forms has always been a way to guarantee information security. Back in the days, an 
increasingly data-driven society
2
 has not changed the paradigm: European data protection law, i.e. 
the GDPR, envisages encryption as means to assure the principles underpinning information 
security
3
. Recently, the European Data Protection Supervisor claimed that encryption is “natural 
mean for data protection, and for personal data protection as well: GDPR, in this sense, is 
reflecting a natural state”
4
. Indeed, ongoing research efforts in the field of Internet of Things 
(IoT), acknowledge that one of the most pressing concerns is developing lightweight encryption 
protocols suited to storage and computational power capacities of IoT devices, which are mostly 
resource-constrained, in order to secure data flow
5
. 
This paper aims to ascertain whether and to what extent state of the art cryptography may 
challenge the distinction, albeit increasingly blurred, between personal and non-personal data, 
underlying the European data protection legal framework.  
From a methodological viewpoint, the main research question, namely how encrypted data may 
be classified from a data protection viewpoint, lays down the context of the legal analysis.    
Section number two focuses on a technical perspective rather than a legal one, on the 
understandings of cryptography, encryption and pseudonymisation. Such technical taxonomy is 
necessary, given the blurring epistemological boundaries between personal and non-personal 
data.  
The third section sets out the different interpretations of the GDPR to ascertain whether 
“encrypted” data qualifies as personal or not. Against this backdrop, three different 
 
1
 Bruce Schneier, Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World (WW 
Norton & Company, 2015), p. 131. 
2
 Alex Pentland, “The data-driven society” (2013) 309 Scientific American 4, pp. 78–83. 
3
 GDPR refers to encryption as a data protection safeguard several times: in article 32, encryption is enlisted 
prominently as security measure for personal data; when a data breach is notified, data protection authorities has to 
assess not only the impact that breach has created on human rights but also, from a technical viewpoint, what kind 
of mitigation measures were involved and eventually are going to be adopted.  
4
 Wojciech Wiewiórowski, Keynote: Data protection needs encryption, EDPS, 1
st
 Online IPEN Workshop, 3 June 
2020. 
5
 Ammar Rayes and Samer Salam, Internet of Things: from Hype to Reality (2019) 2
nd
 edition, Springer, pp. 211ff; 
Dimitrios Serpanos and Marilyn Wolf, Internet-of-Things (IoT) Systems: Architectures, Algorithms, Methodologies 
(2018) Springer, pp 59-81; Peter Marwedel, Embedded System Design: Embedded Systems Foundations of Cyber-
Physical Systems, and the Internet of Things (2018) 3rd edition, Springer, pp. 191-193. 
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understandings of Recital 26 GDPR are considered, i.e. the absolutist, the relativist and the risk-
based approach.  
The fourth section will cast the light on the polymorphic encryption framework and methodology. 
The legal analysis, integrated with technical considerations, aims at ascertaining whether the 
endorsement of one of the possible readings of Recital 26 GDPR is a kind of zero-sum game or, 
conversely, the relativist and risk-based approach can coexist alongside each other: if the relativist 
approach were to be applied, then many actors, such as cloud service providers, would eschew 
an intensive data protection regime. Moreover, the stance on the ambivalent relation of 
encryption towards human rights
6
 will be discussed by proposing a decentralised key management 
scheme.  
The fifth section then discusses the desirability of the outcome of the fourth section. The relativist 
approach, as regards the case-study under scrutiny, would result in having cloud service providers 
off the hook when it comes to GDPR enforcement. The question that this section seeks to 
address is whether this effect is advisable, in the light of recent business models.  
Finally, the conclusion sums up the findings regarding the balance between the rationale of so-
called digital security technologies (DSTs), i.e. to ensure confidentiality of communication in 
digital environments, and the problem at stake in the context of business trends, models and 
societal power, i.e. individuals profiling over aggregated, allegedly non personal data.  
2. The quest for encryption, beyond pseudonymisation: a technical overview 
The question whether encrypted data are personal or not, hinges on proper epistemological 
classification of the technical concepts of encryption and pseudonymisation. The aim of this 
section is thus to shed light on the relationship of the former with the latter. 
It is worth clarifying from the outset that the word “encryption” itself could be misleading or 
simplistically broad: without dwelling on the various cryptographic algorithms too extensively, a 
classification is needed. Amongst cryptographic tools, a difference can be made between 
symmetric encryption, asymmetric encryption and cryptographic hash function. 
The first type under scrutiny is symmetric or single-key encryption. Through mathematical 
operations, it aims at hiding the content (the so-called plain text, which is named cyphertext after 
the process is completed), by rendering the information unintelligible to anyone who does not 
have the cryptographic key
7
. Encryption is deemed as a two-way function: what is encrypted, via 
an algorithm called “cipher”, can be decrypted with the proper key. As a result, lacking the 
 
6
 Mireille Hildebrandt, “Digital security and human rights: a plea for counter-infringement” (2019) in Mart Susi (ed) 
Human Rights, Digital Society and the Law: A Research Companion, Taylor & Francis, p. 262. 
7
 Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C (1995), Wiley Inc., p. 21. 
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cryptographic key, even the most powerful actor (e.g. States or big tech companies
8
), theoretically, 




The main difference between symmetric and asymmetric encryption is that the latter involves the 
use of two separate keys, whilst the former uses only one key
10
. In this approach, one of the keys 
(public key) can be widely distributed while the other key (secret key) must be kept secret
11
. 
Finally, unlike encryption, cryptographic hash functions are commonly referred to as one-way 
functions, i.e. an irreversible process aiming at scrambling variable-size plain text to produce a 




. In recent years, 




The rationale of cryptography is therefore to protect potentially any kind of information. Indeed, 






 Leander Kahney, “The FBI Wanted a Back Door to the iPhone. Tim Cook Said No” Wired (16
 
Apr 2019): “Apple 
and the government had been at odds for more than a year, since the debut of Apple’s encrypted operating system, 
iOS 8, in late 2014. iOS 8 added much stronger encryption than had been seen before in smartphones. It encrypted 
all the user’s data—phone call records, messages, photos, contacts, and so on—with the user’s passcode. The 
encryption was so strong, not even Apple could break it”. 
9
 William Stallings and Lawrence Brown, Computer Security: Principles and Practice (2018) 4
th
 edition, Pearson, p. 
55: “a block cipher processes the plaintext input in fixed-size blocks and produces a block of ciphertext of equal size 
for each plaintext block. The algorithm processes longer plaintext amounts as a series of fixed-size blocks. The most 
important symmetric algorithms, all of which are block ciphers, are the Data Encryption Standard (DES), triple DES, 
and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)”. 
10
 Id., p. 67: authors immediately clear the field from potential misconceptions concerning public-key encryption. 
First, there is nothing in principle about either symmetric or public-key encryption that makes one superior to 
another from the point of view of resisting cryptanalysis or brute-force attacks; second, there seems no foreseeable 
likelihood that symmetric encryption will be abandoned for the benefit of asymmetric encryption. 
11
 Richard R Brooks, Introduction to Computer and Network Security: Navigating Shades of Gray (2014) CRC Press, 
Talyor & Francis Group, p. 100. 
12
 EDPS and AEPD, Introduction to the Hash Function as a Personal Data Pseudonymisation Technique (2019), 
pp. 8-10; Quynh Dang, Recommendation for Applications Using Approved Hash Algorithms (2012), NIST Special 
Publication 800-107, pp. 6-9; Richard R Brooks (fn 11), p. 91. 
13
 William Stallings and Lawrence Brown (fn 9), p. 65: this property concerns the impossibility to “find an alternative 
message with the same hash value as a given message. This prevents forgery when an encrypted hash code is used”. 
14
 Bart Preneel, “The First 30 Years of Cryptographic Hash Functions and the NIST SHA-3 Competition” (2010) 
CT-RSA 2010: Topics in Cryptology, Springer, 1-14. 
15
 Karen Scarfone, Murugiah  Souppaya and Matt Sexton, Guide to Storage Encryption Technologies for End User 
Devices (2007), NIST Special Publication, 800-111. 
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Pseudonymisation, instead, is conceived by the GDPR
16
 as a means of reducing risks to data 
subjects
17
 by hiding the identity of individuals in a dataset, e.g. by replacing one or more personal 
data identifiers with the so-called pseudonyms (and appropriately protecting the link between the 
pseudonyms and the initial identifiers)
18
. Even though the (re)identification’s risk is reduced, 
pseudonymised data fall nevertheless within the scope of GDPR: it is certainly true that such 
processing prevents direct identification through attribution, but not through the test set by Recital 
26 and article 4 GDPR
19
, which clearly specifies the personal nature of such data.  
The relation link between those techniques, might be built upon a speciality criterion, based on 
the values they aim at securing. Encryption, thus, can also be used to protect the identities of 
individuals, whereas pseudonymisation’s scope cannot consider other identifiers.  
A second variable of the analysis of the techniques under scrutiny predicates on the value of the 
resulting text after such operations: contrary to encrypted data, pseudonymised data still provide 
some legible information and, thus, a third party (i.e. other than the controller or processor) may 
still understand the semantic (structure) of the data. Pseudonymisation is indeed considered by 




 Thirdly, these operations potentially overlap: encryption and hash function are in turn two 
possible ways to reach pseudonymisation’s goals. Article 29 Working Party listed, among the 
most used pseudonymisation techniques, encryption with secret key (i.e. traditional two-way 





 GDPR, article 4(5): “the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be 
attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional 
information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data 
are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person”. 
17
 GDPR, Recital 28. 
18
 Konstantinos Limniotis and Marit Hansen, Recommendations on Shaping Technology According to GDPR 
Provisions - An Overview on Data Pseudonymisation (ENISA, 2018), p. 17. 
19
 Miranda Mourby et al, “Are ‘pseudonymised’ data always personal data? Implications of the GDPR for 
administrative data research in the UK” (2018) 34 Computer Law and Security Review 2, p. 225: “[i]t is Recital 26 
GDPR which must be used to establish whether data are personal”. 
20
 GDPR, Article 89 and Recital 156. 
21
 William Stallings and Lawrence Brown (fn 9), p. 983: in cryptography, a pepper is a “random [and secret value] 
that is concatenated with a password before applying the one-way encryption function used to protect passwords that 
are stored in the database of an access control system”. It differs from salt, since the latter is not secret (merely 
unique) and can be stored alongside the hashed output; Paul A Grassi et al., Digital Identities Guidelines (NIST 
Special Publication, 800-63B, 2017), sec. 5.1.1.2: NIST does not make any formal difference between salt and 
pepper, by referring to both as salt. The pepper value recommended is at least of 32 bits: the US agency assures that 
if the pepper value is kept secret, brute-force attacks on the hashed memorized secrets are impractical. 
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function with deletion of the key and tokenization
22
. A classificatory misconception underlies 
these notions: if GDPR mentions encryption and pseudonymisation as security measures 
alongside each other
23
, Article 29 Working Party seems to categorize the former as a means of 
achieving the latter
24
. However, the main scopes of these techniques are different, albeit they may 
sometimes overlap, as it is well described in a recent ENISA report
25
. 
3. The personalisation debate in the cryptographic domain  
In order to ascertain whether encrypted data qualifies as personal or not, the legal test to look at 
in the GDPR’s dichotomous architecture, that is between personal and non-personal data, is 
based on Recital 26 GDPR
26
: in accordance with the GDPR, data is personal when the controller 
or another person can identify the data subject by using the “means reasonably likely to be used”. 
The Recital goes further on specifying the personal nature of data undergone under 
pseudonymisation, whilst anonymisation techniques render GDPR inapplicable
27
. Even though 
encryption could be a means of pseudonymisation, (en)crypted data are not aprioristically 
categorised.  
However, some tenets of this test are left in a space of uncertainty, resulting from conflicting 
interpretations and understandings by different supervisory authorities. Albeit article 4(1) GDPR 
lays down the definition of personal data, Recital 26 GDPR, as well as the earlier Recital 26 
Directive 95/46, further specifies the test determining the scope of data protection
28
. Therefore, 
the analysis focuses on three possible readings of Recital 26.    
 
22
 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques (2014), WP 216, pp. 20-21. 
23
 GDPR, Article 32(1).  
24
 Article 29 Working Party (fn 22), pp. 20ff.   
25
 Konstantinos Limniotis and Marit Hansen (fn 18), pp. 17ff. 
26
 GDPR, Recital 26: “[p]ersonal data which have undergone pseudonymisation, which could be attributed to a 
natural person by the use of additional information should be considered to be information on an identifiable natural 
person. To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably 
likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person 
directly or indirectly. To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural person, 
account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, 
taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments. 
27
 Id, “[n]amely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to personal data 
rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. 
28
 Case C-582/14 Patrick Breyer [2016] EU:C: 2016:779; see fn 19. 
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The first interpretation is predicated on the so-called absolute approach
29
. This understanding 
envisages all possibilities and chances in which anyone would be able to identify the data subject: 
while GDPR explicitly refers only to the possibility of “singling out”
30
 an individual, the Working 
Party goes further, by adding to the de-identification test the criteria of “linkability”31 and 
“inference” 32. It results that “even theoretical chances of combining data so that the individual 
is identifiable are included”33. Thus, A29WP sets a high threshold to meet: as noted by Finck 
and Pallas, it seems to establish its own “zero-risk test” 34, hence implying that the “outcome of 
anonymisation as a technique applied to personal data should be, in the current state of 
technology, as permanent as erasure”35, i.e. making it impossible to process personal data. In 
the context of encryption, either symmetric or asymmetric, i.e. two-way cryptography, if anyone 
is theoretically able to decrypt the dataset, then “the operations of the controller or processor 
using this encrypted data are subject to data protection legislation, even if they don’t possess the 
key for decryption”36. Interestingly, the Working Party, in an earlier opinion, stated that one-way 
cryptography (hash function) creates in general anonymised data37, but afterwards it claimed that 
hash functions are “usually designed to be relatively fast to compute”38. In so doing, A29WP 
implicitly grouped all cryptographic means under the personal label, so to speak. The absolute 
approach, nonetheless, can hardly be sustained: there is thriving literature about the non-absolute 
nature of anonymisation39. Thus, if we could never rely on the non-personality of data, then any 
information that was once within the scope of the GDPR would always remain personal data.  
 
29
 Gerald Spindler and Philipp Schmechel, “Personal Data and Encryption in the European General Data Protection 
Regulation” (2016) 7 JIPITEC 163, p. 165; Christopher Kuner, European Data Protection Law: Corporate 
Compliance and Regulation (2
nd
 edition, Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 92. 
30
 Article 29 Working Party (fn 22), p. 11: singling out refers to “the possibility to isolate some or all records which 
identify an individual in the dataset”. 
31
 Id, p. 11: linkability refers to the risk where attacker can establish (e.g. by means of correlation analysis) that two 
records are assigned to a same group of individuals but cannot single out individuals in this group 
32 
Id, p. 12: inference has been envisaged as “the possibility to deduce, with significant probability, the value of an 
attribute from the values of a set of other attributes”. 
33
 Gerald Spindler and Philipp Schmechel (fn 29), p. 165.  
34
 Michèle Finck and Frank Pallas, “They who must not be identified—distinguishing personal from non-personal 
data under the GDPR” (2020) 10 International Data Privacy Law 1, p. 15  
35
 Article 29 Working Party (fn 22), p. 6.  
36
 Gerald Spindler and Philipp Schmechel (fn 29), p. 165.  
37
 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data (2007), WP 136, p. 18. 
38
 Article 29 Working Party (fn 22), p. 20. 
39
 Paul Ohm, “Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization” (2010) 57 
UCLA Law Review 2, pp. 1701ff; Latanya Sweeney, “Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely” (2000) 
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The second understanding of Recital 26 considers the relativist approach. As underlined by 
Spindler and Schmechel, the role of the data controller and her effort in establishing a link 
between a person and the data is crucial in order to understand the extent of the concept of 
personal data
40
. This reading takes only into account the efforts required by data controllers to 
identify an individual, thus setting aside mere theoretical possibilities
41
. In the context of 
cryptography, several authors argued that data resulting from such operations should not be 
considered personal data if two requirements are met: the cryptographic method must be 
effective, solid and up to date
42
 and the data controller (or any other third party) is either not in 
possession of the decryption key or she has no reasonable chances to obtain the key
43
. Even 
though the relativist stance has been endorsed in other contexts as well (e.g. when the 
Commission decided that transferring key-coded data to the U.S. would not be a transmission of 
personal data, as the decryption key had not been sent together with the data
44
; the ECJ, when 
ruling on “Safe Harbour’s” validity
45
, has not altered the Commission’s view on that point
46
), this 
reasoning was particularly successful in the field of cloud computing
47
: leaving aside cryptography 
as a means of pseudonymisation
48
, two-way encryption (either symmetric or asymmetric) of full 
 
671 Health, pp. 1–34; Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov, “Robust De-anonymization of Large Sparse Dataset” 
(2008) IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 111–125. 
40
 Gerald Spindler and Philipp Schmechel (fn 29), p. 165.    
41
 Id, p. 166.  
42
 The evaluation would mainly consider three factors: algorithm’s cryptographic strength; encryption key length; 
security of decryption key storage.  
43
 Samson Esayas, “The Role of Anonymisation and Pseudonymisation Under the EU Data Privacy Rules: Beyond 
the ‘All or Nothing’ Approach” (2015) 6 European Journal of Law and Technology 2, pp. 8-9; Patrick Lundevall-
Unger and Tommy Tranvik, “IP Addresses – Just a Number?” (2011) 19 International Journal of Law and 
Information Technology 1, p. 53.  
44 
Commission Decision 2000/520/EC of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles and related 
frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce [2000] OJ L215/7, p. 24. 
45
 Case C-362/14 Maximiliam Schrems [2015] EU:C: 2015:650.   
46
 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield 
[2016] OJ L207, 66. The ECJ, when ruling the so-called Schrems II (Case C-311/18 Facebook Irland and Schrems 
[2020] EU:C:2020:559), has once again invalidated the Commission’s decision: nonetheless, the Court has not taken 
a stance on the so-called key-coded data.    
47 
OPTIMIS Project D7.2.1.2., Cloud Legal Guidelines: Data Security, Ownership Rights and Domestic Green 
Legislation (2011), 8; Kuan W Hon, Christopher Millard and Ian Walden, “The problem of ‘personal data’ in cloud 
computing: what information is regulated? - the cloud of unknowing” (2011) 1 International Data Privacy Law 4, p. 
217. 
48
 Kuan W Hon, Christopher Millard and Ian Walden (fn 47), pp. 218-219: “[i]rreversibly hashing direct identifiers 
cannot prevent identification through indirect identifiers, other information in the dataset, and/or other sources. 
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datasets could be deemed non-personal data in the provider’s control if “within the specific 
scheme in which those other controllers (e.g. cloud service providers) are operating 
reidentification is explicitly excluded and appropriate technical measures have been taken in this 
respect”
49
. From the reading of Finck and Pallas, the understanding of A29WP is granitic, 
crystallised and flattened, so to speak, on an absolutist interpretation of Recital 26
50
. Nevertheless, 
the abovementioned A29WP Opinion on the concept of personal data, precisely regarding key-
coded data, arguably assumes a relativist understanding. Moreover, in the context of irreversible 
hashing, “[e]ven if identification of certain data subjects may take place despite all those protocols 
and measures (due to unforeseeable circumstances such as accidental matching of qualities of the 
data subject that reveal his/her identity ), the information processed by the original controller may 
not be considered to relate to identified or identifiable individuals taking account of all the means 
reasonably likely to be used by the controller or by any other person”
51
. It is an open question 
whether A29WP’s absolutist stance, clearly highlighted in the Opinion on Anonymisation 
Techniques, is to resist.  
The last reading of Recital 26 hinges on the risk-based approach. The recent work of Fink and 
Pallas revolves around the thesis whereby the safest and most correct interpretation of Recital 26 
needs to be risk-orientend, thus completely discarding an absolutist view, supported inter alia by 
A29WP. It has been briefly said above that anonymisation, which has as an outcome non-
personal data, can never be absolute; rather, risks remain. They argue that Recital 26 GDPR 
embraces a risk-based approach, following the very inspiration of the Regulation, to assess the 
personal nature of data. “If data can be matched to a natural person with reasonable likelihood, 
it qualifies as personal data and falls within the GDPR’s scope of application. If de-personalization 
has been sufficiently strong so that identification is no longer reasonably likely, this is non-
personal data and accordingly falls outside the Regulation’s scope of application”
52
. They take as 
an argument the leading case in this matter, i.e. Breyer
53
. It is worth noticing that Breyer confirmed 
such an approach as the Court evaluated the actual risk of identification
54
. In a nutshell, the Court 
assessed the personal nature of Mr. Breyer’s dynamic IP address even if the data required for his 
 
Thus, personal data where identifiers have been deleted or one-way hashed may, after considering such ‘means likely 
reasonably to be used’, remain ‘personal data’”. 
49
 Article 29 Working Party (fn 37), p. 20.  
50
 Michèle Finck and Frank Pallas (fn 34), p. 15: “[t]his strict position is in line with earlier guidance from 2007 
according to which anonymized data is data “that previously referred to an identifiable person, but where that 
identification is no longer possible”. 
51
 Article 29 Working Party (fn 22), p. 20 
52
 Michèle Finck and Frank Pallas (fn 34), p. 34.  
53
  see fn 28. 
54
 Frederik Z Borgesius, “The Breyer Case of the Court of Justice of the European Union: IP Addresses and the 
Personal Data Definition” (2017) 3 European Data Protection Law Review 1, pp. 130–137. 
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identification were not held by German authorities, i.e. the data controller in such scenario, but 
by the internet service provider, i.e. a third party
55
. This stance dismisses a pure relativist approach, 
as “there is no requirement that all the information enabling the identification of the data subject 
must be in the hands of one person”
56
. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Finck and Pallas
57
, an 
English court recently adopted a prudent understanding of Breyer, arguing that the possibility 
accorded by the law to the controller (i.e. German authorities, in Breyer case) to gain access to 
data to “identify a natural person would [not] make that procedure a means reasonably likely to 
be used”
58
. Once again, the relative criterion is getting closer.  
As regard to cryptography, they value of the study of Finck and Pallas lies precisely in 
demonstrating that state-of-the-art cryptographic hash functions, such as SHA-3
59
, alongside an 
appropriate pepper length
60
, shall eschew the Regulation’s scope of application. Thus, “with the 
even more resistant bcrypt-hashes, however, 32 bits of pepper would lead to more than 140 years 
with 10,000 current GPUs”
61
, which is definitely not an effort that can possibly be deemed as 
“reasonably likely”. EDPS and AEPD (Spanish Agency for Data Protection) ended up with the 
same result, albeit with a more cautious approach
62
. Therefore, it seems safe to assume that there 
is no more room for upholding the absolutist approach, when it comes to categorise data from a 
data protection viewpoint.  
Provided that up-to-date one-way encryption should be considered non-personal data, what about 
two-way encryption? Is that tout-court meant to be personal data? 
 
55
 Case C-582/14 (fn 52), para. 49. 
56 
Id, para. 43; see also Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 03/2003 on Purpose Limitation (WP203, 2003), p. 31: 
“a very significant grey area, where a data controller may believe a dataset is anonymised, but a motivated third party 
will still be able to identify at least some of the individuals from the information released”. 
57
 Michèle Finck and Frank Pallas (fn 34), p. 18. 
58
 Mircom International Content Management & Consulting Ltd v Virgin Media Ltd (EWHC 1827, 2019), p. 27. 
59
 Morris J Dworkin, SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions (NIST FIPS, 
202, 2015), sec. v: together with SHA-1 and SHA-2 families, theseis standards will “[p]rovide resilience against future 
advances in hash function analysis, because they rely on fundamentally different design principles. In addition to 
design diversity, the hash functions in this Standard provide some complementary implementation and performance 
characteristics to those in FIPS 180-4”. 
60 
See fn 23: pepper is a random [and secret] value that is concatenated with a password before applying the one-way 
encryption function used to protect passwords that are stored in the database of an access control system. 
61
 Michèle Finck and Frank Pallas (fn 34), p. 26. 
62
 EDPS and AEPD (fn 12), pp. 17-18. 
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4. One size does not fit all: the case of polymorphic encryption as an argument in favour of the 
relativist approach. 
The aim of this section is to investigate whether a relative understanding of Recital 26 may be 
applied alongside the risk-based approach. It will discuss whether the endorsement of one of the 
above-mentioned readings of Recital 26 GDPR is a kind of zero-sum game.  
The truly interdisciplinary nature of the claim to be asserted makes it necessary to look for 
arguments to support it outside the social sciences; this would justify the recourse to computer 
science. The case of polymorphic encryption, indisputably a two-way function (i.e., reversible), 
may be a case in point. In their white paper, the authors (i.e. Verheul, Jacobs, Meijer, Hildebrandt 
and de Ruiter) present a novel approach for the management of sensitive personal data, especially 
in health care: the core concept is to put the data subject at the heart of encryption’s operational 
and decision-making process
63
, by providing for the necessary security and privacy infrastructure 
for big data analytics where data comes from various sources
64
, likewise in IoT scenarios
65
. Even 
though a proper analysis on differential privacy
66
 falls outside the scope of the paper, it is worth 
mentioning that Apple, as Pagallo observes
67
, mastered such techniques in its endeavours to 
process health data for statistical purposes, eschewing therefore GDPR’s regime
68
.  
Polymoprhic Encryption and Pseudonymisation methodology (hereafter, PEP) hinges on both 
encryption and pseudonymisation: albeit fundamental for the functioning of the process, the aim 
of this study is to focus on the former. The assumption is that traditional asymmetric encryption 
(therein called “public key encryption”) is too rigid: there is only one “key” able to decipher the 
information encrypted. The ground-breaking concept behind this process is predicated on two 
consequential steps. First, this technology enables strong encryption at the source, so to speak, 
thus ensuring that either transport or Cloud facility’s storage occurs to data which have been 
already encrypted: “polymorphic encryption works in a generic manner, and the decisions about 
 
63
 Eric Verheul et al, “Polymorphic Encryption and Pseudonymisation for Personalised Healthcare” (White Paper, 
Institute for Computing and Information Sciences Radboud University Nijmegen, 2016). 
64
 Eric Verheul and Bart Jacobs, “Polymorphic encryption and pseudonymisation in identity management and 
medical research” (2017) 5 NAW 18, p. 168. 
65
 Lukas Malina et al, “A Privacy-Enhancing Framework for Internet of Thing Services” (2019) International 
Conference on Network and System Security, Springer, pp. 77-98. 
66 
Aaron Roth and Cynthia Work, “The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy, Foundation and Trends” 
(2014) 9 Theoretical Computer Science 3-4, pp. 211-407. 
67 
Ugo Pagallo, “The Legal Challenges of Big Data: Putting Secondary Rules First in the Field of EU Data Protection” 
(2017) 3 European Data Protection Law Review 1, p. 36. 
68
 Pursuant to Recital 162 GDPR, statistical purposes are “any operation of collection and the processing of personal 
data necessary for statistical surveys or for the production of statistical results”. 
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who can decrypt need not be taken at the time of encryption”
69
. It follows that “no data-
management staff, hosting partner or cloud-service provider has the ability to access and decrypt 
the data”
 70
. For each data subject, it shall be assumed that there is a private master key x, securely 
stored by a trusted Key Server, in secure hardware: it is never used for decryption
71
. Second, the 
data subject plays a crucial role in deciding who can decrypt such data (most likely the decision 
will be based upon policy’s terms)
72
: anyone chosen for decrypting (personal) data will be given a 
unique private key, derived from the one and only private master key x. Afterwards, an 
intermediate party, called the Tweaker, grants access to the chosen parties by re-keying messages 
encrypted with the public master key: the Tweaker “is a central converter who exclusively knows 
how to turn the wheel on a polymorphic lock so that keys of specific parties fit”
73
. It is however 
crucial noting that the Tweaker works blindly: it does not know x; hence it cannot see the actual 
content of the information she is giving the access for
74
.  
This implementation of polymorphic encryption therefore seems to explicitly recall a relativist 
vision of Recital 26 GDPR: the perspective from which identifiability shall be assessed is that of 
data controller
75
 precisely because until the tweaker grants her access, neither she nor any other 
third party can decrypt the data encrypted at the source. The application protocols of this 
cryptographic means are by their essence “relative”, since cyphertext, hence possibly sensitive 
personal data, is disclosed upon data subject’s choice to specific (and trusted) parties. 
Assuming that it is not a zero-sum game, one can possibly apply the risk-based understanding 
within this relativist approach: it has to be analysed therefore to what extent PEP security 
assumptions can be deemed solid so  identification is reasonably unlikely but for the chosen 
parties who can decrypt data. Verheul et al. delve into this from a technical viewpoint by 
 
69
 Eric Verheul et al (fn 62), p. 8.  
70
 Bart Jacobs and Jean Popma, “Medical research, Big Data and the need for privacy by design” (2019) 6 Big Data 
& Society 1, p. 4. 
71 
Eric Verheul et al (fn 62), p. 32. 
72
 Eric Verheul and Bart Jacobs (fn 63), p. 168; Eric Verheul et al (fn 62), p. 19: “PEP can be based on the first 
ground, consent, which is usually combined with a privacy policy or terms of service. We believe that its aims are 
better achieved by the introduction of a (modular) `data licensing agreement' (DLA) that makes sure that data are 
only processed insofar as necessary for the performance of the agreement by a party that is not allowed to share the 
data with other parties. The latter should always conclude their own DLA to obtain their own key. This ensures that 
data subjects have a clear overview of the parties that process their sensitive data”.  
73
 Eric Verheul et al (fn 62), p. 7: the Tweaker has a central role in assigning local or different pseudonyms as well. 
Thus, each data subject will have different pseudonym at different parties, since “[t]hese parties could somehow lose 
their data, or even maliciously combine data with others. If different parties use different pseudonyms for the same 
patient, it is in principle not possible to combine the data, at least not on the basis of identifiers” (11). 
74
 Eric Verheul and Bart Jacobs (fn 63), p. 168; Eric Verheul et al (fn 62), p. 8.  
75 
Michèle Finck and Frank Pallas (fn 33), p. 8. 
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concluding that their “re-randomized versions of polymorphic pseudonyms, encrypted 
pseudonyms and encrypted data […] are not linkable to the original version”
76
. Following a 
relativist tenet, these encrypted data should be considered non-personal to anyone who does not 
have access to them, e.g. Key Server, Tweaker, Cloud Service Provider and ideally any other 
third party. Nevertheless, the security of the system rests inevitably on having two separate trusted 
parties, one holding the master private key, and one ‘transformer’, i.e. the Tweaker, holding the 
key factors for each service provider. If these two trusted parties collude, the system breaks 
down
77
. The question, now, is whether collusion between those parties is reasonably unlikely. If 
it were to follow the reasoning of the Court in Breyer, identification would not be reasonably 
likely if achieved by means prohibited by the law
78
. However, as Purtova pointed out, since re-
identification results indeed from illegal acts, “a more nuanced reasoning would be that a legal 
prohibition to combine data for identification would make the means of identification ‘less 
reasonably likely to be used’, rather than ‘not reasonably likely’”
79
. Anyhow, the Breyer test is 
passed.  
4.1 Increasing trust by implementing a distributed key-management scheme 
Albeit encryption is widely acknowledged as a guarantee for data protection and information 
security, the dependency on trusted third parties for key management (e.g. the master key server 
and the Tweaker, in the vein of PEP framework) and certification led Hildebrandt to conclude 
that even such digital security technology (hereafter called DSTs) is not neutral to human rights, 
as it spurs “new vulnerabilities that require further DSTs to detect fraudulent third parties or 
attacks against trusted platforms”
80
. The consideration that the higher the number of keys, the 
higher the risk would relate to a systemic problem in the context of polymorphic encryption. 
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Yet, the decentralised re-keying scheme can arguably lower the risk by avoiding potential 
collusions
82
: the trust in the overall system would increase accordingly. Through the adoption of 
several security protocols, such as Shamir’s secret sharing
83
, Ismail et al. propose a scheme 
allowing the data subject to get total control over the generation and management of the 
decryption keys without relying on a trusted authority
84
: if two or more parties (eg, Cloud service 
providers) combine the keys, they cannot decrypt data
85
. Thus, there is much thriving literature 
confirming that secret sharing algorithms can be successfully applied either to distribute the 
encryption key among a number of cloud nodes
86
 or to divide data subject’s encrypted data into 
shares to be stored in different cloud service providers
87
. Notwithstanding, is an outcome that 
softens data protection legal framework towards actors with tremendous computational power 
even just desirable? 
5. A reason for concern: paving the way to large data-driven companies heaven? 
Adopting the relativist approach could bring a scenario where cloud service providers, for 
instance, would see their legal obligations lowered, so to speak, since they will not have to follow 
data protection principles. All in all, European personal data protection regime, i.e. the GDPR, 
embraces many overarching principles such as availability, integrity, accountability and plenty 
more: data confidentiality is not the only value at stake. The problem of our increasingly data-
driven society is primarily with those who wish to analyse data without considering them personal. 
Indeed, there are reasons for concern to go down the road of finding ways to exempt 
intermediaries and cloud services from personal data obligations because it allows them to 
process data for their own ends coupled with lowered safeguards for data subjects.  
Against this backdrop, attention shall be turned to what is happening between two known big 
data-driven corporations: Google and Mastercard. the former knows who actually viewed an 
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International Conference on Smart Homes and Health Telematics, Springer, Cham, p. 257.  
85
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86
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Cryptology— INDOCRYPT Berlin, Springer, 290–309; Jonathan Gill et al, “SYSTEM: Secure Cloud Storage, 
Auditing, and Access Control for Electronic Health Records” (2012) Working Paper, Department of Computer 
Science University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.  
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 Tatiana Ermakova and Benjamin Fabian, “Secret sharing for health data in multiprovider clouds” (2012) 
International Conference on Business and Informatics, 93–100; Hanlin Zhang et al, “Cloud Storage for Electronic 
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advertisement and the latter knows who purchased a product and how much  has been spent
88
As 
highlighted by Michael Veale, the question ultimately boils down to whether it is feasible to build 
a model tailored for targeted and personalised advertisement by combining the two aggregated 
datasets without seeing personal data of the other party
89
. Long story short, yes. It happened.   
According to Veale, by using a cryptosystem, called private set intersection
90
, partially based upon 
homomorphic encryption
91
, Google and Mastercard eventually paired up, resulting as output of 
such collaboration an aggregate non-personal dataset on total expenditures of those who saw 
advertisements. Their next logical step seems to be getting rid of the initial personal data from 
the process, to further distance the firm from data protection legal regime: for example, these 
data could be put on a browser or on a user device
92
. The latter perfectly casts the light on recent 
trends in data management within the world of (big) data-driven companies. There is a thriving 
research in designing models for users profiling without data leaving their devices: using MPC or 
homomorphic encryption, companies train shared models based on tracking data that never 
leaves an individual’s phone. This trend is particularly exacerbated by walled gardens, like IoS, 
resulting in practical inability of users to check what code is running on their systems. Against this 
backdrop, a secure multi-party computation protocol could be considered, since it allows many 
actors to collectively compute a function over aggregated data which may not be considered 
personal
93
. Each subject holds pieces of, without revealing what she effectively holds to any other 
player, i.e. the content of data. Accordingly, large-scale actors are investing more and more in 
training and improving machine learning classifiers to extract knowledge from such aggregated 
data. As in the case of polymorphic encryption scheme, they would not have access to such data 
but they would have access to the end result of the aggregation process (in the Google/Mastercard 
example, they could see users’ total expenditures based on viewed advertisements). Thus, several 
authors proposed to conceive such machine learning models trained and working over allegedly 
non personal data as personal data in order “to re-balance or at least disrupt the power relations 
 
88
 Mark Bergen and Jennifer Surane, “Google and Mastercard cut a secret ad deal to track retail sales” Bloomberg 
(30 Aug 2018).  
89
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90
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91
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annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pp. 169-178. 
92
 Weisong Shi, Jie Cao, Quan Zhang, Youhuizi Li and Lanyu Xu, “Edge computing: vision and challenges” (2016) 
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between those holding models and those whose data are used to train them”
94
. Reducing liability 
and accountability is the actual dream of large companies, dangerously paved by models that aim 
at narrowing the scope of data protection legal regime.  
6. Conclusion    
In sketching some conclusive remarks, the risk-based approach, as opposed to absolutist 
understanding, should be recognised as the correct interpretative key for the reading of recital 26. 
Yet, an attempt has been made to illustrate how the case of polymorphic encryption can be 
theoretically used as an argument for the revival of a debate on the relativistic approach in the 
post-Breyer period, in a perspective of complementarity and not exclusion of the risk-based one. 
Thus, a solid technical risk assessment shall always be carried out to ascertain to what extent re-
identification is reasonably likely. What has been tried to argue is that those data, encrypted with 
specific two-way functions, such as PEP methodology, shall be considered non-personal to all 
those who are denied the possibility of decryption. By putting the data subject at the very centre 
of operational decisions in the context of data encryption, the control’s paradigm would be 
rebalanced towards the data subjects’ side, albeit data controllers remain accountable for the 
processing: the user is empowered to decide each time, and not necessarily at the time of 
encryption, who can access (parts of) her data and for which purpose.  
A combined application of the two criteria mentioned above could ultimately mitigate the highly 
intensive and non-scalable regime enforced by GDPR: the technical instruments could therefore 
restore a renewed equilibrium in the unbalanced relationship between personal and non-personal 
data
95
, eschewing for the moment the scenario outlined by Purtova
96
. 
Notwithstanding, encryption is done for a purpose. The last section aims at casting the light on 
the balance between the rationale of so-called digital security technologies (DSTs),
97
 and the 
problem at stake in the context of business trends, desires, business models and societal power. 
When discussing encryption schemes, it is more and more necessary to holistically understand 
the processing purpose, what actors are trying to achieve, what are the possible outcomes if 
different legal regimes apply. All in all, altering the personal data definition could be dangerous, 
as it would reduce responsibilities (e.g. security principles ex art.32 GDPR; data protection by 
 
94
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95
 Inge Graef, Raphael Gellert and Martin Husovec, “Towards a holistic regulatory approach for the European data 
economy: Why the illusive notion of non-personal data is counterproductive to data innovation” (2019) 44 European 
Law Review 5, pp. 605-621. 
96
 Nadezhda Purtova (fn 78), p. 75. 
97
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design ex art. 25 GDPR; limitation and accountability principles ex art. 5 GDPR) for certain 
actors over others. Definitional changes in the context of the personalisation debate need to be 
seen in terms of much wider changes in encrypted computation to avoid a scenario where 
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